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Casenotes
ACTION TO IMPRESS TRUST ON STOCK
IS IN PERSONAM
Ortman v. Coane'
Plaintiff brought an action in Maryland, the state of
incorporation of X, alleging that he had bought every
claim, right or ascertainable right, action or cause of action
of any and every kind and nature which A, a non-resident
of Maryland, had against X and its officers by virtue of the
stock A owned in X; and seeking to have a trust impressed
upon A's stock, to the end that A might be decreed to have
no right to bring a stockholder's derivative suit on behalf
of X against its officers and directors. A was not personal-
ly served within the state of Maryland. A appeared spe-
cially and pleaded that the Court lacked jurisdiction as the
action was in personam, requiring personal service within
the jurisdiction. The Court held with A and dismissed the
suit, stating that as the question of the ownership of the
stock was not presented, the situs of the stock could not
be concluded to be in Maryland to support an action in rem.
The Court recognized that where there is a claim to
ownership of corporate stock, the situs of the stock is re-
garded as being in the state of incorporation. This principle
was established in the case of Jellenik v. Huron Mining
Co.,' where the Supreme Court said: ". . . As the habita-
tion or domicil of the company is and must be in the state
that created it, the property represented by its certificates
of stock may be deemed to be held by the company within
the state whose creature it is, whenever it is sought by
suit to determine who is its real owner";8 and was applied
in the case of McQuillan v. National Cash Register Co.,4
where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Judicial
Circuit recognized that the stock of a corporation incor-
porated in Maryland had a situs in Maryland within the
meaning of the federal statute permitting action in the
district in which property is situated, so that the federal
1181 Md. 596, 31 A. 2d 320, 145 A. L. R. 1388 (1943).
2177 U. S. 1, 44 L. Ed. 647, 20 S. Ct. 559 (1900).
0177 U. S. 1, 13, 44 L. Ed. 647, 651, 20 S. Ct. 559, 563 (1900).
'112 Fed. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), cert. den. 311 U. S. 695, 85 L.
Ed. 450, 61 S. Ct. 140.
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district court for the district of Maryland could entertain
an action to cancel the stock."
But the Court of Appeals made a clear distinction be-
tween the cases where the ownership of stock is questioned
and the instant case where no such issue was raised. Here
the sole relief sought was that a trust be impressed upon
the stock. The situation appears to be novel. The estab-
lishment of trusts has been sought before, and has been
allowed, where the stock was within the jurisdiction but
the defendant was not. However, in the cases allowing
such relief, there was, in addition to the request for the
establishment of the trust, a claim to the title of the stock.
For example, the cause of action in Amparo Mining Co. v.
Fidelity Trust Co.,6 was one against the executor of the
president of a corporation situated within the jurisdiction
of the court. It was contended that the president, who had
acquired the stock of the corporation by advancing a sum
of money in settlement of a claim against the corporation,
held the stock in trust for the corporation. There was, as
in the instant case, an attempt to impress a trust on the
stock, and this was allowed, although the defendant was a
non-resident. However, there was a further prayer in the
Amparo Mining Co. case which is lacking here, namely a
prayer to the effect that the defendant be required to
assign, transfer and deliver the stock to the plaintiff. And
other cases have held that suits to impress a trust upon
stock are in rem, but in each such case there was an ac-
companying claim of ownership of the stock.'
' In the McQuillan case the Court also considered the effect of the Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act, which act is in effect in Maryland. See Md.
Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 55 et 8eq. The District Court was of the opinion
that "In the absence of some decision of the Supreme Court clearly indi-
cating that the result reached in the Jellenik Case is not required where
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act is in effect in the state of the corporation's
creation, we are unwilling to attempt to qualify the full effect of that deci-
sion." 13 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D. Md. 1935). The Circuit Court of Appeals
approved this conclusion. 112 F. 2d 877, 881 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940). Both
courts relied upon a like holding in the case of Harvey v. Harvey, 290
Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923). See also 145 A. L. R. 1397.
6 75 N. J. Eq. 555, 73 A. 249 (1909).
'See, for example, Fahrig v. Milwaukee & C. Breweries, 113 Ill. App.
525 (1904) and Patterson v. Farmington Street R. Co., 76 Conn. 628, 57 A.
853 (1904), in which latter case the court said: ". . . We cannot doubt that
an action calling upon our courts to enforce equitable liens, adjust equita-
ble interests in such property, and to compel the registry in the books of
the company of the legal title in the owner of the property, as determined
by the court, is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which justifies a court,
in a proceeding against property within its jurisdiction, to bind all persons
with respect to their interest in that property, upon giving them reasonable
notice in the manner prescribed by law, and is fully consistent with the
principle recognized in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 . ..
ORTMAN v. COANE
So the Ortman case appears to be unique in holding
that an action to impress a trust upon stock in the domicil
of the corporation is in personam, but it is not in conflict
with any of the cases in the field, there being none precisely
analagous. And while the holding appears at first glance
to be somewhat narrow, yet its influence could be regarded
as casting no small measure of doubt upon the validity of
a number of decrees passed by the Maryland courts.
For the purposes of this note, actions may be classified
as falling within three categories: first, those clearly char-
acterized as actions in personam, e. g., those seeking an
order that something be done by the defendant, such as an
order that he pay a sum of money; second, those plainly
denominated as actions in rem, that is, those against prop-
erty or seeking to effect a change of status, such as attach-
ment or divorce a vinculo; third, lying between these two
extremes, those seeking neither an order that something
be done nor a change of relationship or status, but rather,
merely having for their object a declaration that a par-
ticular matter or relationship does or does not exist.8 In
addition to any proceeding for purely declaratory relief
under the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ments Act, there would be included in this last category
of declaratory actions divorces a mensa et thoro9 annul-
ments of marriage0 and declarations that stock is im-
pressed with a trust.11 Each merely announces the truth
as to a particular matter, without more. Up to the instant
case there has been no holding by the Maryland courts
as to whether decrees of this nature, that is, decrees of di-
8 The Restatement on Judgments does not define actions in personam or
actions in rem and quasi in rem. Nowhere in the Restatement is there
set forth a definite standard or classification by which actions can be
placed within one of the two major categories, other than in a rather un-
satisfactory introductory portion ahead of Section 1. This makes no at-
tempt to classify a vinculo divorce, nor to face the problem of the declara-
tory proceeding, here discussed.9 It is apparent that a mensa divorce (aside from any incidental grant of
alimony) is nothing more than a declaratory ruling that the defendant has
committed certain misconduct which justifies the plaintiff in living apart.
This fact could as well be established collaterally in other litigation.
10 Similarly, annulment of marriage is nothing more than a declaratory
ruling that the marriage was defective ab initio. To be sure, for those
marriages merely voidable, it is a required step so as to declare the neces-
sary election by the aggrieved party to assert the voidness.
2 Decrees effecting a change of name are also declaratory in nature.
Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 118 provides that one desiring to change his
name by court decree may do so by filing a bill In equity. The problem of
notice is not the same as in the cases where divorces, annulments and
declarations of trust in stock are concerned, for the proceeding is e., parte,
but the notice given is to the public at large. Anyone objecting to the
change may appear before the court and state his reasons for such objec-
tion, but the action does not name a particular defendant, as do the other
actions mentioned.
1944]
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vorce a mensa, of annulment of marriage or declaring the
existance of a trust on stock are to be treated as in rem
or as in personam. However, as to partial divorces and
annulments, the courts have, as a practical matter, treated
them as in rem. 2
In the case of divorces, it is customary to grant partial
divorces as well as absolute divorces against non-resident
defendants without personal service upon them within the
jurisdiction. It is expressly provided by statute that "....
if the party against whom the bill is filed be a non-resident,
then such bill may be filed in the court where the plaintiff
resides; and upon such bill the same process by summons,
notice or otherwise, shall be had to procure the answer and
appearance of a defendant, as is had in other cases in
chancery, ... .,,3 And Article 16, Section 149 of the Mary-
land Code sets forth the procedure to be followed in chan-
cery where the proceeding is directed against a non-resi-
dent, which procedure consists of service by publication
or personal service outside of the jurisdiction. 4
It is likewise the practice in Maryland to grant annul-
ments of marriage against non-residents where the only
service given to the absent defendant is by publication or
by service outside the jurisdiction. Prior to 1947 there
was no express statutory authority for the use of orders
12 It is also true that the Restatement on Judgments regards divorces a
mensa and annulments of marriage as being in the same category as di-
vorces a vinculo. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, section 33, comment a.
It is interesting to observe in passing that the Supreme Court played havoc
with section 113, RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, upon which reliance is
placed in the above comment, in the case of Williams v. North Carolina,
317 U. S. 287, 87 L. Rd. 279, 63 S. Ct. 207 (1942) ; 325 U. S. 226, 89 L. Ed.
1577, 65 S. Ct. 1092 (1945).1' Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 38.
1 "In all suits in chancery against non-residents or against persons who
may be proceeded against, as if they were non-residents, the court may
order notice to be given by publication, in one or more newspapers, stating
the substance or object of the bill or petition, and warning such party to
appear on or before the day fixed in such order and show cause why the
relief prayed should not be granted, and such notice shall be published as
the court may direct, not less, however, than once a week for four succes-
sive weeks, previous to 15 days before the day fixed by such order for the
appearance of the party; provided, if a copy of the order be personally
served on such party one month before the day fixed for his appearance,
if he be within the limits of the United States, or three months if beyond,
such service shall have the same effect as a publication. Proof of such ser-
vice must be as follows: First, if served by the sheriff, his certificate
thereof; second, if by any other person, his affidavit or affirmation thereof
made and signed before a notary public and certified by him; third, the
written admission of the defendant proved to the satisfaction of the court;
and such certificate, affidavit, affirmation or admission shall state the time
and place of service. And any person making a false affidavit or affirma-
tion as to any such service shall be guilty of perjury, and any sheriff
making a false certificate, as to the service of any such notice shall be
liable for making a false return."
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of publication in annulment cases, and there was doubt as
to the proper county for an annulment case to be filed in
when there were two or more possible ones under the
given facts." By a statute enacted in 1947,18 annulment
practice is assimilated to that for divorce, so that orders of
publication may clearly be used, and the case may be filed
either where the plaintiff resides, where the defendant re-
sides, or where the ceremony of marriage was performed.
Thus, to reiterate, actions for divorces a mensa and for
annulments of marriage have generally been treated as
being actions in rem, or quasi in rem, for constructive ser-
vice by publication or service outside of the jurisdiction
has been regarded as sufficient to give the Court jurisdic-
tion over the person of a non-resident. However, it seems
that if an action seeking to impress a trust upon stock is
in personam, requiring personal service within the juris-
diction, as was held by the Court of Appeals in the Ortman
case, so too are suits for partial divorces and annulments
of marriage, all three actions being of the same general
nature. The same might be said for declaratory pro-
cedure in general, although that type of procedure is so
novel both in Maryland and elsewhere, that no doctrine
has been established about jurisdiction.
Of course, it might be pointed out that the Ortman case
was decided under the existing general and common law
of the State, and determined that jurisdiction to impress
a trust was in personam, lacking any local statute author-
izing it to be exercised on an in rem basis. On the other
hand, a mensa divorce and, by recent change, annulment,
can be said to involve the express statutory authorization
of the in rem basis under the statutes set out above. This
suggests a distinction between what is the local, conflict of
laws rule of a given state, variable by statute, as to the
jurisdictional basis of declaratory procedures, and what
the Supreme Court of the United States will eventually
tolerate as a minimum basis under due process of law. To
date that Court has not ruled on the point and, until it
does, it may be that a State may be allowed to choose one
basis for one and another for the rest of the various
declaratory procedures. This seems to be the current
Maryland practice, as pointed out above.
15 On which see Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and
their Annulment (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 256-59.
26 Md. Laws (1947) Ch. 849, amending Md. Code (1939) and Md. Code
Supp. (1943) Art. 16, Secs. 38, 39, Art. 62, Sec. 16, putting all civil annul-
ment jurisdiction under the provisions of Art. 16, Sec. 38, as amended, but
also providing that convictions of certain types of marital crime shall serve
as annulments after recording on the Equity dockets.
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